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Abstract. Coherent state photon sources are widely used in quantum information
processing. In many applications, such as quantum key distribution (QKD), a
coherent state is functioned as a mixture of Fock states by assuming its phase is
continuously randomized. In practice, such a crucial assumption is often not satisfied
and, therefore, the security of existing QKD experiments is not guaranteed. To bridge
this gap, we provide a rigorous security proof of QKD with discrete-phase-randomized
coherent state sources. Our results show that the performance of the discrete-phase
randomization case is close to its continuous counterpart with only a small number (say,
10) of discrete phases. Comparing to the conventional continuous phase randomization
case, where an infinite amount of random bits are required, our result shows that only
a small amount (say, 4 bits) of randomness is needed.
PACS numbers:
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1. Introduction
In many quantum optics applications, such as QKD [1, 2], linear optics quantum
computing [3], bit commitment [4], coin flipping [5] and blind quantum computing [6],
a perfect single photon source is assumed to be used, which is not feasible with current
technology. Instead, a weak laser is widely used to replace the single photon source in
practice. A laser can be well described by a coherent state [7],
|α〉 = e− |α|
2
2
∑ αn√
n!
|n〉, (1.1)
on which a phase modulation by θ ∈ [0, 2pi) implements the operation |α〉 to ∣∣αeiθ〉.
For a coherent state, there is a nonzero probability to get components other than single
photons, such as vacuum states and multi photon states. To model this imperfection,
a photon number channel model is used [8], which assumes the phase of the coherent
state is randomized,
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
∣∣αeiθ〉〈αeiθ∣∣dθ = ∞∑
n=0
e−|α|
2 |α|2
n!
|n〉〈n|. (1.2)
A physical interpretation behind Eq. (1.2) is that when the phase of a coherent state
is randomized, it is equivalent to a mixed state of Fock states whose photon number
follows a Poisson distribution with a mean of |α|2. In other words, the Fock states are
totally decohered from each other with continuous phase randomization.
We remark that phase randomization as specified in Eq. (1.2) is a common
assumption in the theoretical models of many quantum information processing protocols.
In practice, as will be discussed further below, the assumption of continuous phase
randomization is often not satisfied in experiments. Therefore, the security of a protocol
(e.g. the security of a generated key in QKD) is not guaranteed.
To illustrate the problem, for simplicity, let us consider the example of QKD. The
first QKD protocol is published in 1984 by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) [1]. Lots
of progress has been made since then both theoretically and experimentally [9]. For
the BB84 protocol, secure key bits can be transmitted only when single photon states
are used. From the study of photon-number-splitting (PNS) attacks [10], one can see
that multi photon components are not secure for the BB84 protocol. The key idea to
take this imperfection into consideration is by performing privacy amplification on key
bits from good (single photon) states and bad (multi photon) states separately [11].
Meanwhile, in order to accurately quantify the amounts of key bits from good and
bad states, the decoy-state method has been proposed [12, 8, 13] and experimentally
demonstrated [14, 15, 16, 17, 18].
For all the existing security analysis for coherent-state QKD protocols, including
a recent QKD protocol [19], continuous phase randomization, Eq. (1.2), is assumed.
It has been shown that when the phase is not randomized, the performance will be
substantially reduced with a strict security proof [20]. In fact, there are experimental
quantum hacking demonstrations showing that a QKD system may be attacked when
the phase is not randomized lately [21, 22].
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There are two means to randomize the phase in practice, passive and active. In a
passive phase randomization process, the laser is turned on and off to generate pulses.
One might be tempted to make a naive argument that by switching a laser on and off, the
phase is fully randomized. Note that it is experimentally challenging to verify rigorously
that a continuous phase is indeed fully random. Moreover, experiments in random
number generation have shown that there are indeed residue correlations between the
phases of adjacent pulses [23], especially in the case of high-speed applications [24],
which directly rejects the claim since fully randomized phases have no correlations.
Thus we avoid this approach here.
In the active phase randomization process, a phase modulator is used to randomly
modulate the phases. In this case, the modulator can only perform discrete phase
randomization, unless it uses an infinite amount of random numbers. In a recent
experiment [25] with coherent states, each global phase is chosen from one of the over
1000 possible values. First, such a large number of phases demands high precision
control, which is a challenge for practical implementations. Second, even with 1000
phases, the phase is still discrete and the key rate may be deviated from the continuous-
randomization case. So far, no rigorous bound on the key rate was derived in this
experiment [25] or any other QKD experimental papers. Since the work of Lo and
Preskill was published [20], it has been a long-standing question to analyze the security
of a practical QKD system with discrete-phase randomization and rectify the highly
unsatisfactory situation that there is no proof of security in existing experiments.
In this work, we solve this long-standing open question by providing a rigorous
security proof of QKD systems using discrete-phase-randomized coherent states. Here,
we consider unconditional security, following the standard security proof [11]. That is
to say, security against the most general type of attacks allowed by quantum mechanics
on the quantum channel by an eavesdropper. We show that as the number of discrete
phases increases, coherence between the Fock states in Eq. (1.1) decreases exponentially
fast. As an application, we provide tight security bounds for both non-decoy and decoy
state QKD protocols with discrete phase randomization. Our result applies to various
encoding schemes of QKD including time-bin, phase encoding and polarization encoding.
In simulation, we compare the performance of our security bounds with the one
provided by continuous phase randomization, which shows that our security bounds are
tight when the number of phases goes to infinity. From a practical point of view, for
small number of phases (say, only N = 10 phases), with a typical set of experimental
parameters, we observe that secret keys can be securely distributed over a fiber length
of up to 138 km, close to 140 km in the continuous phase randomized case. Thus
Alice needs only less than 4 bits (24 > 10) of random numbers per pulse for phase
randomization. In contrast, all previous security proofs essentially assume an infinite
number of bits of random numbers per pulse. Therefore, we are making an improvement
here. Moreover, our scheme is simple to implement. For instance, an implementation of
active phase randomization with 1000 discrete phases has been reported in literature [25].
Due to the massive reduction in the number of phases in our scheme (10 phases), one
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can expect a simpler implementation with a much higher repetition rate. Besides QKD
protocols, our analysis of discrete phase randomization is also readily applicable to
linear optics quantum computation [3] and other quantum cryptographic primitives [5],
because phase-randomized coherent sources serve also as major parts in them.
2. Results
The roadmap of this section is as follows. In Section 2.1, we use the Schmidt
decomposition to construct states that are close to Fock states from discrete-phase-
randomized coherent states. In Section 2.2, we present the phase encoding scheme
when discrete-phase-randomized coherent states are used, and investigate how close the
approximated Fock states are. In Section 2.3, we give a security proof and derive a key
rate formula for a QKD system with discrete-phase randomization. In Section 2.4, we
present the simulation results for two cases: with and without the decoy-state method.
2.1. Coherent state mixture
Here, we consider a coherent state source whose phase is randomly picked from N
different values, i.e., each with probability 1/N . For the sake of simplicity, we assume
these N values are evenly distributed in [0, 2pi),
{θk = 2pik
N
|k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. (2.1)
In the case of continuous phase randomization (when N → ∞), Eq. (1.2) essentially
shows that one can decompose the phase-randomized coherent mixed state into a
statistical mixture of Fock states, |n〉〈n|. In the application of QKD, as well as quantum
computing [3], the single photon state, |1〉〈1|, is the most important component.
In the case of a finite N , one can decompose the mixed state to a set of pure states
and hopefully, one of which is close to single photon state. First let us consider the case
N = 2. We start with the initial state
|Ψ2〉 = |0〉A
∣∣√2α〉
B
+ |1〉A
∣∣−√2α〉
B
, (2.2)
where the phase of coherent state
∣∣√2α〉
B
is controlled by a quantum coin A. The factor√
2 is included in the state for system B to simplify later discussions. The normalization
factor is ignored throughout the paper unless it matters. By performing a Schmidt
decomposition
|Ψ2〉 = (|0〉A + |1〉A)|λ0〉B + (|0〉A − |1〉A)|λ1〉B, (2.3)
where the two pure states are given by
|λ0〉 =
∣∣√2α〉+ ∣∣−√2α〉, (2.4)
|λ1〉 =
∣∣√2α〉− ∣∣−√2α〉.
By substituting the definition of coherent state, Eq. (1.1), it is not hard to see that
|λ0〉 (|λ1〉) is a superposition of even (odd) photon number Fock states. By this
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decomposition, the Hilbert space is divided into the even and odd number Fock state
spaces, Heven ⊕ Hodd. Since |λ1〉 only contains odd photon number Fock states, we
expect it is close to a single photon state, which can be confirmed from the calculation
of fidelity later.
In the case of general N ≥ 1, the decomposition is similar but a bit more complex,
|ΨN 〉 =
N−1∑
k=0
|k〉A
∣∣√2αe2kpii/N〉
B
(2.5)
=
N−1∑
j=0
|j〉A|λj〉B
where |j〉A can be understood as a quantum coin with N random outputs and the N
pure states are given by
|λj〉 =
N−1∑
k=0
e−2kjpii/N
∣∣e2kpii/N√2α〉. (2.6)
By substituting Eq. (1.1), we have the following observations for |λj〉. It is a
superposition of Fock states whose photon numbers modulo N are the same j,
|λj〉 =
∞∑
l=0
(
√
2α)lN+j√
(lN + j)!
|lN + j〉. (2.7)
Then, it is not hard to see that |λj〉 becomes close to a Fock state when N is large since√
(lN + j)! increases fast. When N →∞, it becomes a Fock state |λj〉 = |j〉. Later in
the simulation, one can see that when N = 10, the mixed coherent state becomes close
to Fock state mixture in terms of performance of QKD. Similar to the case of N = 2,
the Hilbert space is divided into H0 mod N ⊕H1 mod N ⊕ . . .⊕H(N−1) mod N .
Next, we can figure out the probability if Alice performs a projection measurement
on the photon state in the basis of |λj〉, which is simply the norm of Eq. (2.7),
Pj =
〈λj|λj〉∑N−1
j=0 〈λj |λj〉
=
∞∑
l=0
µlN+je−µ
(lN + j)!
, (2.8)
where µ = 2|α|2. When N → ∞, it becomes a photon number channel and follows a
Poisson distribution µje−µ/j!.
2.2. Coherent state scheme
A typical scheme using a coherent state source, e.g., a phase encoding QKD scheme, is
shown in Fig. 1, which is essentially an interferometer. In the state preparation stage,
Alice prepares a weak coherent state
∣∣√2α〉, whose phase is modulated randomly by the
first phase modulator PM1. The state is separated into two pulses, |α〉r and |α〉s, by a
beam splitter. And then Alice encodes the bit and basis information (say, according to
the BB84 protocol) in the relative phase via the second phase modulator PM2.
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Figure 1: Schematic diagram for the phase-encoding QKD scheme with
coherent states. The first phase modulator, PM1, is used for phase
randomization according to Eq. (2.1), and the second one, PM2, is used
for QKD encoding φ ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}.
Here, for simplicity, we consider the case that the reference pulse has the same
intensity with the signal. Our results can be extended to the strong reference case [26, 27]
and the asymmetric case [28], as well as other encoding schemes such as polarization
encoding and time-bin encoding [29].
In the scheme with discrete N -phase randomization, the photon source is
decomposed into states |λj〉 as shown in Eq. (2.6). After going through the phase
encoding scheme as shown in Fig. 1, the four BB84 states encoded in |λj〉 can be written
as ∣∣0Lx〉 =
N−1∑
k=0
e−2kjpii/N
∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉
∣∣1Lx〉 = N−1∑
k=0
e−2kjpii/N
∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉∣∣−e2kpii/Nα〉
∣∣0Ly 〉 = N−1∑
k=0
e−2kjpii/N
∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉∣∣ie2kpii/Nα〉 (2.9)
∣∣1Ly 〉 = N−1∑
k=0
e−2kjpii/N
∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉∣∣−ie2kpii/Nα〉,
where we omit the subscript j on the left side, but it should be understood that the
four states do depend on j.
The key point to guarantee the security of the BB84 protocol is that Eve cannot
distinguish the state in two conjugate bases, X and Y . The two density matrices in the
two bases can be written as
ρx =
∣∣0Lx〉〈0Lx ∣∣ + ∣∣1Lx〉〈1Lx ∣∣
ρy =
∣∣0Ly 〉〈0Ly ∣∣ + ∣∣1Ly 〉〈1Ly ∣∣. (2.10)
Note that each logical state should be regarded as a pure normalized state. In the ideal
case, where a basis-independent source, such as a single photon source, is used, the
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density matrices in the two bases should be the same,
ρx = ρy. (2.11)
In the security analysis, one of the key parameters is the basis dependence of the source,
which is the fidelity between the two states in the X and Y bases,
Fj(ρx, ρy) = tr
√√
ρyρx
√
ρy (2.12)
≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑∞
l=0
µlN+j
(lN+j)!
2−
lN+j
2
(
cos lN+j
4
pi + sin lN+j
4
pi
)
∑∞
l=0
µlN+j
(lN+j)!
∣∣∣∣∣∣
where µ = 2|α|2 and the detailed fidelity evaluation is shown in the Appendices.
Denote F
(t)
j as the t-th order approximation of the fidelity, by taking l = 0, . . . , t
in the summation. The zeroth order is
F
(0)
j ≥
∣∣∣∣2−j/2
(
cos
j
4
pi + sin
j
4
pi
)∣∣∣∣+O
(
µNj!
(N + j)!
)
. (2.13)
One can see that F
(0)
0 = F
(0)
1 = 1 and F
(0)
2 = 1/2, F
(0)
3 = 0, F
(0)
4 = 1/4, . . .. Since
when F < 1/
√
2 would not render any positive key rate [20], it is confirmed that multi
photon states are not secure for QKD due to their large basis dependence in the BB84
protocol.
Take the first order for |λ0〉 and |λ1〉,
F
(1)
0 ≥ 1−
(
1− 2−N−12 cos N − 1
4
pi
)
µN
N !
+O
(
µ2N
(N !)2
)
(2.14)
F
(1)
1 ≥ 1−
(
1− 2−N2 cos N
4
pi
)
µN
(N + 1)!
+O
(
µ2N
[(N + 1)!]2
)
.
The fidelity approaches to 1 rapidly as N becomes large, especially when µ is small,
as shown in Fig. 2. This shows with enough discrete phases, one can approximate the
vacuum state and the single photon state infinitely well, which is useful in applications
such as QKD.
2.3. Key rate
In the perfect phase randomized case, the key rate formula is given by the standard
GLLP security analysis for QKD with practical devices [11, 8],
R ≥ − Iec +Q1[1−H(ep1)],
Iec = fQµH(Eµ), (2.15)
Q1 = Y1µe
−µ.
Here, Iec is the cost of error correction; Qµ and Eµ are the overall gain and quantum bit
error rate (QBER), respectively, which can be directly measured in QKD experiments;
Q1, Y1, and e
p
1 are the gain, yield, and phase error rate of the single-photon component,
respectively; µe−µ is the (Poisson) probability that Alice sends single photon states; µ
denotes the expected photon number of the signal state; f denotes the error correction
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Figure 2: (Color Online) Plots of fidelity for different values of mean photon
number µ. The fidelity here refers to F0, which is always smaller than F1 by
the numerical evaluation.
efficiency; and H(p) = −p log2(p) − (1 − p) log2(1 − p) is the binary Shannon entropy
function, where p is a binary probability. We assume that Alice and Bob run the efficient
BB84 [30] and take the basis sift factor to be 1.
The QKD key rate formula, Eq. (2.15), is derived using ideas of entanglement
distillation [31] and complementarity [32]. It satisfies the composable security definition
[33, 34]. In QKD protocols, Alice and Bob need to perform error correction to eliminate
the errors and share an identical key. In this error correction procedure, a fraction of Iec
sacrificed from the raw key. Then, they need to eliminate the eavesdropper’s information
on the error-corrected key via privacy amplification. The perfect phase randomization
allows us to consider the signal as a mixture of Fock states and estimate the contributions
of the components of different photon numbers separately [8]. Since multi-photon
components are not secure in the BB84 protocol [10], only the single-photon component
Q1 will appear in the key formula [11]. The amount of the eavesdropper’s information
in the single-photon component is related to the phase error rate, ep1.
The core of a practical security analysis is to figure out the privacy amplification
term Q1[1 − H(ep1)] in Eq. (2.15). For a single-photon state, it is a basis-independent
source, thus its phase error rate is equal to its bit error rate [35]. Now, the key point of
the analysis is to estimate the yield and bit error rate of the single-photon component,
Y1 and e
b
1. This estimation can be done with different means, such as the decoy-state
method [12, 8, 13].
In the case of discrete phase randomization, the photon source is not decomposed
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into Fock states. Instead, we decompose the channel into |λj〉 according to Eq. (2.5).
The single photon state will be replaced by |λ1〉 and the Poisson distribution will be
replaced by Eq. (2.8). Then, the approximated single-photon state |λ1〉 is no longer a
basis-independent source. The basis dependence of the source is evaluated in Section 2.2,
which causes deviation between the bit and phase error rates.
Now we can slightly modify Eq. (2.15) to fit our case
R ≥ −Iec +
∑
j
PjYj[1−H(epj )], (2.16)
where Pj is given in Eq. (2.8). The yield Yj and bit error rate e
b
j of |λj〉, can be estimated
by the decoy state method. Here, without any confusion, we use the same notation as
the Fock state case for simplicity. Given the basis dependence ∆j , one can bound the
phase error rate epj from e
b
j similar to the work of Lo and Preskill [20],
epj ≤ ebj +4∆j(1−∆j)(1−2ebj)+4(1−2∆j)
√
∆j(1−∆j)ebj(1− ebj).(2.17)
The basis dependence is defined as
∆j =
1− Fj
2Yj
. (2.18)
where the fidelities Fj are given in Eq. (2.12). The key difference between our result
and the original GLLP analysis is that the bit and phase error rates are not the same
in the “single”-photon component.
From the evaluation of the basis dependence, it is not hard to show that only j = 0
and j = 1 would contribute positively to the final key rate. Thus, the key rate evaluation
becomes the following minimization problem.
min
0≤Yj ,ebj≤1
{P0Y0[1−H(ep0)] + P1Y1[1−H(ep1)]}. (2.19)
There are other constraints based on the gain and QBER obtained from the experiments.
Note that with other security proof techniques the key rate given in Eq. (2.16) can be
improved. For example, the vacuum component Q0 is showed [36] to have no phase
errors when the photon number channel model is applied.
2.4. Parameter estimation
Now, we need to estimate the key parameters, Yj and e
b
j. First, let us consider the
no-decoy state case, where we assume all the losses and errors come from |λ0〉 and |λ1〉,
in the worst case scenario,
P0Y0 + P1Y1 ≥ Qµ −
N−1∑
j=2
Pj,
e0P0Y0 + e1P1Y1 ≤ EµQµ. (2.20)
Since the right side of Eq. (2.20) can be obtained from the experiment directly, one can
easily solve the minimization problem presented in Eq. (2.19) to get the key rate.
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We simulate a typical QKD system [37] and compare various cases of N . The
result is shown in Fig. 3, from which we can see that with only 4 random phases,
the performance of discrete phase randomization is close to the one of continuous phase
randomization. We can also observe the key rate of one phase and two phases are similar,
but there is a gap when the phase number becomes three. This can be explained as
follows. We note that F
(2)
0 of N = 1 coincides with Eq. (22) in the work of Lo and
Preskill [20], thus our fidelity formula also extends to the N = 1 case. Also we notice
that the first order term of N = 1 vanishes, making the key rate performance of N = 1
and N = 2 to be similar, both of order 1 − O(µ2). For N ≥ 3, the performance is
improved to 1−O(µN). The details of this simulation and all following simulations are
shown in the Appendices.
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Figure 3: (Color Online) Plots of key rates of the no-decoy state scheme for
different numbers of random phases N . When N = 1, it refers to no phase
randomization case. When N → ∞, it approaches to continuous phase
randomization case.
For the case of the decoy-state method, the analysis is trickier. In the perfect phase
randomized case, the decoy state method immensely improves the key rate by offering
accurate parameter estimation for Eq. (2.19). In the security proof of the decoy-state
method, the photon number channel model guarantees the following equalities,
Yn(signal) = Yn(decoy),
en(signal) = en(decoy) (2.21)
since all the Fock states |n〉〈n| are the same in the signal and decoy states. Thus adding
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decoy states imposes more equations constraints on the parameters,
Qµ =
+∞∑
j=0
µje−µ
j!
Yj,
EµQµ =
+∞∑
j=0
µje−µ
j!
ejYj,
Qν =
+∞∑
j=0
νje−ν
j!
Yj, (2.22)
EνQν =
+∞∑
j=0
νje−ν
j!
ejYj,
without inducing more variables other than the original unknown variables. Here,
µje−µ/j! is the (Poisson) probability that Alice sends j photons states. This
consequently gives tighter bounds on Yj and ej .
This is not so straightforward in N discrete phase randomization case, because∣∣λµj 〉 6= ∣∣λνj 〉 (2.23)
as defined in Eq. (2.7), where µ and ν are the intensities of signal and decoy states.
Thus, we do not have the simple relations as the continuous phase randomization case,
Eq. (2.21). Fortunately, we have shown that |λj〉 is close to the Fock state |j〉. We
expect the inequality shown in Eq. (2.23) to be an approximate equality.
Following the quantum coin argument used in the GLLP security analysis [11], the
yield and error rate difference between the signal and decoy states are given by
|Y µj − Y νj | ≤
√
1− F 2µν , (2.24)
|eµj Y µj − eνjY νj | ≤
√
1− F 2µν ,
where
Fµν = 1−O
(
µN
N !
)
. (2.25)
Now the extra constraints added to the minimization problem of Eq. (2.19) for the
decoy-state method are, along with Eq. (2.24),
Qµ =
N−1∑
j=0
P µj Y
µ
j ,
EµQµ =
N−1∑
j=0
eµjP
µ
j Y
µ
j ,
Qν =
N−1∑
j=0
P νj Y
ν
j , (2.26)
EνQν =
N−1∑
j=0
eνjP
ν
j Y
ν
j ,
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where P µj are given in Eq. (2.8). If more decoy states are used, more linear equations
will be added to Eq. (2.26).
We simulate a QKD system [37] with vacuum+weak decoy state [38] and compare
various cases of phase number N . The decoy and signal intensities are numerically
optimized to maximize the key rate. The result is shown in Fig. 4, from which we can
see that with only 10 random phases, the performance of discrete phase randomization
is close to the one of continuous phase randomization.
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Figure 4: (Color Online) Plots of key rates of the decoy-state scheme for
different numbers of random phases N . Dashed line refers to the continuous
phase randomization case. Solid lines from left to right refer to increasing N
from 3 to 10.
Notice that the QBER with discrete phases highly depends on the experimental
parameters. According to our simulation model, each QBER in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 is
a function of the signal intensity µ, which is numerically optimized to maximize the
key rate. This may not lead to the highest tolerable QBER for a given transmission
distance. The reason is that by tuning the signal intensity µ smaller, one can increase
the tolerable QBER at the expense of lowering the key rate. Eventually, the hard bound
on the allowable QBER is 11% just like the single photon BB84 protocol despite the
number of discrete phases used, as we are following the Shor-Preskill security proof [35]
and an infinitely small µ effectively turns a coherent state source into a single photon
source.
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3. Discussion
In summary, we just need 10 random phases for the discrete phase randomization, the
fidelity of which is close to the continuous case. We demonstrate the effect of discrete
phase randomization by taking the QKD protocol as an example and show that it gives a
big improvement on the performance. Without phase randomization, the key rate decays
rapidly as a function of the transmittance of the channel and drops to zero after less than
15km of optical fibers as shown in Fig. 3. In contrast, with discrete phase randomization,
the key rate scales linearly as a function of the transmittance and QKD remains feasible
over 138km of fibers as shown in Fig. 4. Since only four bits of random numbers per pulse,
which already give 24 = 16 > 10 possible phases, are required for phase randomization,
our scheme is highly practical. Note that a much harder discrete phase randomization
experiment with 1000 phases [25] has already been demonstrated. Moreover, our method
may not only apply to the same signal and reference pulse amplitudes case, but also to
the asymmetric amplitude case and the strong reference pulse case. We remark that
our discrete phase randomization idea applies to other quantum information processing
protocols including blind quantum computing and quantum coin tossing.
There are a few interesting prospective projects. First, due to the finite length
of the key, statistical fluctuation needs to be taken into consideration which can be
dealt with by finite key analysis as in a recent work [39]. Second, N -discrete-phase-
randomization process might not be perfect in an actual system, i.e., there can be a
small fluctuation in the phase modulation such that the actual phase applied will be
{δk+ 2pikN }k=0,1,...,n−1 where δk is a small fluctuating value that can be positive or negative.
The imperfect phase modulation can be dealt with by modifying our fidelity calculations.
More precisely, one can replace the coherent state
∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉 by ∣∣e2kpii/N+δkα〉 in Eq. (2.9)
and calculate the fidelity in Eq. (2.12). We expect the result will be robust against
small δk. Besides the usual BB84 QKD protocols, our idea can also be extended to
measurement-device-independent QKD [40] by treating both sources as discrete phase
randomized.
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Appendix A. Basis dependence
This appendix and the following appendices are functioned as follows. In Appendix A,
the basis dependence between the X and Y (fidelity of two density matrices) for |λj〉
is calculated when N discrete randomized phases are used. In Appendix B, we present
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the parameter estimation of the decoy-state method. In Appendix C, the pseudo codes
for both nondecoy and decoy simulation are given.
In order to make the derivation easier to understand, we use index n to represent
the photon number, index k to represent the discrete phase, index j to represent the
decomposed Fock state approximations.
We restate the four BB84 states phase encoded in the decomposed state |λj〉 as
presented in Main Text,
∣∣0Lx〉 =
∑N−1
k=0 e
−2kjpii/N ∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉√
Ne−2|α|2
∑N−1
k=0 e
2kjpii/Ne2|α|2e−2kpii/N
∣∣1Lx〉 =
∑N−1
k=0 e
−2kjpii/N ∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉∣∣−e2kpii/Nα〉√
Ne−2|α|2
∑N−1
k=0 e
2kjpii/Ne2|α|2e−2kpii/N
(A.1)
∣∣0Ly 〉 =
∑N−1
k=0 e
−2kjpii/N ∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉∣∣ie2kpii/Nα〉√
Ne−2|α|2
∑N−1
k=0 e
2kjpii/Ne2|α|2e−2kpii/N
∣∣1Ly 〉 =
∑N−1
k=0 e
−2kjpii/N ∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉∣∣−ie2kpii/Nα〉√
Ne−2|α|2
∑N−1
k=0 e
2kjpii/Ne2|α|2e−2kpii/N
,
where the denominators are the normalization factors.
To evaluate the fidelity between the two states in the two bases, we calculate the
related inner products of these four states,
〈
0Lx |0Ly
〉
=
〈
1Lx |1Ly
〉
=
Ne−2|α|
2∑N−1
k=0 e
2kjpii/Ne|α|
2(1+i)e−2kpii/N
Ne−2|α|2
∑N−1
k=0 e
2kjpii/Ne2|α|2e−2kpii/N
,
〈
0Lx |1Ly
〉
=
〈
1Lx |0Ly
〉
=
Ne−2|α|
2∑N−1
k=0 e
2kjpii/Ne|α|
2(1−i)e−2kpii/N
Ne−2|α|2
∑N−1
k=0 e
2kjpii/Ne2|α|2e−2kpii/N
, (A.2)
The detailed calculations of inner products and norms are shown in Section
Appendix A.2. Now we substitute these values to evaluate fidelity,
F (ρx, ρy) = F
(∣∣0Lx〉〈0Lx ∣∣+ ∣∣1Lx〉〈1Lx ∣∣, ∣∣0Ly 〉〈0Ly ∣∣ + ∣∣1Ly 〉〈1Ly ∣∣)
≥ F (|−〉∣∣0Lx〉+ |+〉∣∣1Lx〉, |+i〉∣∣0Ly 〉+ |−i〉∣∣1Ly 〉)
=
1
2
|(〈−|〈0Lx ∣∣+ 〈+|〈1Lx ∣∣)(|+i〉∣∣0Ly 〉 + |−i〉∣∣1Ly 〉)|
=
√
2
4
∣∣〈0Lx |0Ly 〉+ i〈0Lx |1Ly 〉+ i〈1Lx |0Ly 〉+ 〈1Lx |1Ly 〉∣∣ (A.3)
=
√
2
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑N−1
k=0 e
2kjpii/N
[
e|α|
2(1+i)e−2kpii/N + ie|α|
2(1−i)e−2kpii/N
]
∑N−1
k=0 e
2kjpii/Ne2|α|2e−2kpii/N
∣∣∣∣∣∣
where |±〉 and |±i〉 are the normalized eigenstates of the X and Y bases. The inequality
comes from the fact that the fidelity of two mixed states is the maximal of the fidelity
of all the purifications. Here, we use the intuition that two Bell states are the same,
|+〉|−〉+ |−〉|+〉 = |+i〉|+i〉+ |−i〉|−i〉. (A.4)
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Now, let us simplify Eq. (A.3) and we expect it to be close to 1 when N is large.
F (ρx, ρy) ≥
√
2
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x−j
[
e|α|
2(1+i)x + ie|α|
2(1−i)x
]
∑
x−je2|α|2x
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (A.5)
where the summation is taken over x = 1, e2pii/N , . . . , e2pii(N−1)/N , N dots evenly
distributed on the unit circle of the complex plane. Take the Taylor expansion of
µ = 2|α|2 ≥ 0 around 0,
F (ρx, ρy) ≥
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x−j
∑∞
n=0
(µx/
√
2)n
n!
(cos npi
4
+ sin npi
4
)∑
x−j
∑∞
n=0
(µx)n
n!
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑∞
n=0
(µ/
√
2)n
n!
(cos npi
4
+ sin npi
4
)
∑
xn−j∑∞
n=0
µn
n!
∑
xn−j
∣∣∣∣∣ (A.6)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑∞
l=0
µlN+j
(lN+j)!
2−
lN+j
2
(
cos lN+j
4
pi + sin lN+j
4
pi
)
∑∞
l=0
µlN+j
(lN+j)!
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
The the details of Taylor expansion and the calculation of
∑
xn−j are shown in Section
Appendix A.3.
Appendix A.1. Approximations: large N or small µ
Here, we want to check the fidelity given in Eq. (A.6) when N is large or µ is small.
Zeroth order, by taking l = 0 in the summation,
F
(0)
j =
∣∣∣∣∣
µj
j!
2−
j
2
(
cos j
4
pi + sin j
4
pi
)
µj
j!
∣∣∣∣∣ +O
(
µNj!
(N + j)!
)
≈
∣∣∣∣2−j/2
(
cos
j
4
pi + sin
j
4
pi
)∣∣∣∣ (A.7)
One can see that F
(0)
0 = F
(0)
1 = 1 and F
(0)
2 = 1/2, F
(0)
3 = 0, F
(0)
4 = 1/4, . . .. It is
confirmed that multi photon states are not secure for the BB84 QKD protocol.
First order approximation, by taking l = 0 and l = 1 in the summation,
F
(1)
j =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
µj
j!
2−
j
2
(
cos j
4
pi + sin j
4
pi
)
+ µ
N+j
(N+j)!
2−
N+j
2
(
cos N+j
4
pi + sin N+j
4
pi
)
µj
j!
+ µ
N+j
(N+j)!
∣∣∣∣∣∣+O
(
µ2Nj!
(2N + j)!
)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2−
j
2
(
cos j
4
pi + sin j
4
pi
)
+ µ
N j!
(N+j)!
2−
N+j
2
(
cos N+j
4
pi + sin N+j
4
pi
)
1 + µ
N j!
(N+j)!
∣∣∣∣∣∣+O
(
µ2Nj!
(2N + j)!
)
=
∣∣∣∣2− j2
(
cos
j
4
pi + sin
j
4
pi
)
−
[
1− 2−N+j2
(
cos
N + j
4
pi + sin
N + j
4
pi
)]
µNj!
(N + j)!
∣∣∣∣
+O
([
µNj!
(N + j)!
]2)
+O
(
µ2Nj!
(2N + j)!
)
(A.8)
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Since N ≥ j, the second O(·) in the last equality can be neglected. The first order
approximation will approach to the zeroth order exponentially fast, O(µN/N !). We are
interested in the first two cases j = 0 and j = 1,
F
(1)
0 = 1−
[
1− 2−N2
(
cos
N
4
pi + sin
N
4
pi
)]
µN
N !
+O
(
µ2N
(N !)2
)
= 1−
(
1− 2−N−12 cos N − 1
4
pi
)
µN
N !
+O
(
µ2N
(N !)2
)
(A.9)
F
(1)
1 = 1−
[
1− 2−N+12
(
cos
N + 1
4
pi + sin
N + 1
4
pi
)]
µN
(N + 1)!
+O
([
µN
(N + 1)!
]2)
= 1−
(
1− 2−N2 cos N
4
pi
)
µN
(N + 1)!
+O
(
µ2N
[(N + 1)!]2
)
We notes that the second order approximation of F0 when N = 1 coincides with Eq.
(22) in [20], thus our fidelity formula also extends to N = 1 case. Also we notice the
first order term when N = 1 vanishes, making the key rate performance of N = 1 and
N = 2 to be similar, both of order 1−O(µ2). For N ≥ 3, the performance is improved
to 1− O(µN).
Appendix A.2. Inner products and norms
Inner products,
〈
0Lx |0Ly
〉
=
(
N−1∑
l=0
e2ljpii/N
〈
e2lpii/Nα
∣∣〈e2lpii/Nα∣∣
)(
N−1∑
k=0
e−2kjpii/N
∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉∣∣ie2kpii/Nα〉
)
=
N−1∑
l=0
N−1∑
k=0
e2(l−k)jpii/N
〈
e2lpii/Nα|e2kpii/Nα〉〈e2lpii/Nα|ie2kpii/Nα〉
=
N−1∑
l=0
N−1∑
k=0
e2(l−k)jpii/Ne−|α|
2[2−(1+i)e2(k−l)pii/N ] (A.10)
= Ne−2|α|
2
N−1∑
k=0
e2kjpii/Ne|α|
2(1+i)e−2kpii/N
where we use the fact that e2kjpii/N and e−2kpii/N each forms a ring in the complex plane,
and
〈
0Lx |1Ly
〉
=
(
N−1∑
l=0
e2ljpii/N
〈
e2lpii/Nα
∣∣〈e2lpii/Nα∣∣
)(
N−1∑
k=0
e−2kjpii/N
∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉∣∣−ie2kpii/Nα〉
)
=
N−1∑
l=0
N−1∑
k=0
e2(l−k)jpii/N
〈
e2lpii/Nα|e2kpii/Nα〉〈e2lpii/Nα| − ie2kpii/Nα〉
=
N−1∑
l=0
N−1∑
k=0
e2(l−k)jpii/Ne−|α|
2[2−(1−i)e2(k−l)pii/N ] (A.11)
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= Ne−2|α|
2
N−1∑
k=0
e2kjpii/Ne|α|
2(1−i)e−2kpii/N
Norms,
〈
0Lx |0Lx
〉
=
(
N−1∑
l=0
e2lpii/N
〈
e2lpii/Nα
∣∣〈e2lpii/Nα∣∣
)(
N−1∑
k=0
e−2kpii/N
∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉∣∣e2kpii/Nα〉
)
=
N−1∑
l=0
N−1∑
k=0
e2(l−k)pii/N
〈
e2lpii/Nα|e2kpii/Nα〉2
=
N−1∑
l=0
N−1∑
k=0
e2(l−k)pii/Ne−2|α|
2[1−e2(k−l)pii/N ] (A.12)
= Ne−2|α|
2
N−1∑
k=0
e2kpii/Ne2|α|
2e−2kpii/N
Here, we use the inner products between two coherent states,
〈α|β〉 = exp
(
−1
2
|α|2 + α∗β − 1
2
|β|2
)
〈
αeiφ|αeiθ〉 = e−|α|2(1−exp[i(θ−φ)]). (A.13)
It is not hard to see that by adding a same phase to φ and θ, the result is the same.
Appendix A.3. Taylor expansion and summation
Taylor expansion:
e|α|
2(1+i)x + ie|α|
2(1−i)x = 1 +
1 + i
2
µx+
(1+i
2
µx)2
2!
+
(1+i
2
µx)3
3!
+ . . .
+ i+ i
1− i
2
µx+ i
(1−i
2
µx)2
2!
+ i
(1−i
2
µx)3
3!
+ . . .
= (1 + i)
∞∑
n=0
(
µx√
2
)n
1
n!
(cos
npi
4
+ sin
npi
4
) (A.14)
Summation:∑
x
xn−j =
N−1∑
k=0
e−2k(n−j)pii/N , (A.15)
which equals N if n− j mod N = 0 and equals 0 if n− j mod N 6= 0. The summation
is taken over x = 1, e2pii/N , . . . , e2pii(N−1)/N , N dots evenly distributed on the unit circle
of the complex plane.
Appendix B. Parameter deviation in the decoy-state method
Here we consider the parameter (Yj and ej) deviations between the signal states and
the decoy states in the case of N discrete phase randomization. Denote the intensity
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of the signal state to be µ and decoy state to be ν, ν < µ. We want to figure out the
relationships between Y µj , e
µ
j and Y
ν
j , e
ν
j , respectively.
We follow the tagged idea for the phase error estimation [11]. First, we need to
evaluate the fidelity between
∣∣λµj 〉 and ∣∣λνj 〉 as defined in Main Text,∣∣λµj 〉 =
∞∑
l=0
αlN+j√
(lN + j)!
|lN + j〉
∣∣λνj 〉 = ∞∑
l=0
βlN+j√
(lN + j)!
|lN + j〉 (B.1)
where µ = |α|2 and ν = |β|2. We note that these are the states after phase randomization
and before qubit encoding. Then the fidelity is given by
F (
∣∣λµj 〉, ∣∣λνj 〉) = |
〈
λµj |λνj
〉|√〈
λµj |λµj
〉〈
λνj |λνj
〉
=
|∑∞l=0 (α∗β)lN+j(lN+j)! |√∑∞
l=0
|α|2lN+2j
(lN+j)!
∑∞
l=0
|β|2lN+2j
(lN+j)!
=
∑∞
l=0
(µν)lN/2
(lN+j)!√∑∞
l=0
µlN
(lN+j)!
∑∞
l=0
νlN
(lN+j)!
(B.2)
In the last equality, we assume α∗β is a real number, which can be set when their
phases are the same. In experiment, one can think of the scenario where the decoy state
intensity modulation is done after phase randomization. When N → ∞, this fidelity
will go to 1 as the photon number channel model. Take the first order approximation
when N is large or µ is small,
F (
∣∣λµj 〉, ∣∣λνj 〉) = |1 +
(µν)N/2j!
(N+j)!
|[
(1 + µ
N j!
(N+j)!
)(1 + ν
N j!
(N+j)!
)
]1/2 +O
([
µNj!
(N + j)!
]2)
(B.3)
= 1 +
(µν)N/2j!
(N + j)!
− 1
2
µNj!
(N + j)!
− 1
2
νNj!
(N + j)!
+O
([
µNj!
(N + j)!
]2)
= 1−
[
µN + νN
2
− (µν)N/2
]
j!
(N + j)!
+O
([
µNj!
(N + j)!
]2)
One can show that Eq. (B.2) is a non-decreasing function with increasing j,
F (
∣∣λµj 〉, ∣∣λνj 〉) ≥ F (|λµ0 〉, |λν0〉)
=
∑∞
l=0
(µν)lN/2
(lN)!√∑∞
l=0
µlN
(lN)!
∑∞
l=0
νlN
(lN)!
≡ Fµν (B.4)
Apply the quantum coin idea from GLLP [11],√
Y µj Y
ν
j +
√
(1− Y µj )(1− Y νj ) ≥ F (
∣∣λµj 〉, ∣∣λνj 〉)
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eµj Y
µ
j e
ν
jY
ν
j +
√
(1− eµj Y µj )(1− eνjY νj ) ≥ F (
∣∣λµj 〉, ∣∣λνj 〉) (B.5)
Normally Yj is in the order of channel transmittance η. One can see that if
F (
∣∣λµj 〉, ∣∣λνj 〉) ≤ √1− η, the difference can be from [0, 1], which would result in zero
key rate. On the other hand, if F = 1, we have Y µj = Y
ν
j , which is reasonable since the
yields of the same states should be the same.
With the calculations presented in Section Appendix B.1, we can solve Eq. (B.6),
|Y µj − Y νj | ≤
√
1− F 2µν
|eµj Y µj − eνjY νj | ≤
√
1− F 2µν (B.6)
Note that once N , µ and ν are given, Fµν is given by Eq. (B.4) and hence the yield and
error rate differences are fixed.
Appendix B.1. Bound the parameter difference between signal and decoy state
To make it simpler, we rewrite Eq. (B.6) in the following form,
√
ab+
√
(1− a)(1− b) ≥ F (B.7)
where a, b ∈ [0, 1]. Let a = sin2 x and b = sin2 y, where x, y ∈ [0, pi/2], then
F ≤ sin x sin y + cosx cos y
= cos(x− y) (B.8)
Thus,
|x− y| ≤ arccosF (B.9)
Since F is close 1, |x− y| is close to 0. That is, a and b are close to each other,
|a− b| = | sin2 x− sin2 y|
= | sin(x+ y) sin(x− y)|
≤ sin(arccosF ) (B.10)
=
√
1− F 2
Appendix C. Simulation
In this section, we calculate the key rates of both decoy and non-decoy methods derived
in the Main text. We use typical experimental parameters [37] which are ed = 0.033,
η = 10−αL/10ηBob where α = 0.2 dB/km, ηBob = 0.045, Y0 = 1.7 × 10−6 and assumed
an error-correction inefficiency f(e) = 1.16. Here ed is the intrinsic error rate of Bob’s
detectors. For each value of the distance, the signal strength µ has been chosen to
optimize the rate. In the simulation model, Qµ = Y0 + 1− e−ηµ.
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Appendix C.1. Non-decoy
1. First we calculate Pj =
∑∞
l=0
µlN+je−µ
(lN+j)!
.
2. Then we calculate Fj(ρx, ρy) ≥
∣∣∣∣∣
∑∞
l=0
µlN+j
(lN+j)!
2−
lN+j
2 (cos lN+j4 pi+sin
lN+j
4
pi)
∑∞
l=0
µlN+j
(lN+j)!
∣∣∣∣∣.
3. For (e0, e1, Y0, Y1) in the domain defined by
P0Y0 + P1Y1 ≥ Qµ −
N−1∑
j=2
Pj ,
e0P0Y0 + e1P1Y1 ≤ EµQµ
according to the Main text where the notations are defined in the Main text, we calculate
∆j and e
p
j according to Eq. (2.17) and (2.18).
4. Substitute the above quantities into min0≤Yj ,ebj≤1{P0Y0[1−H(e
p
0)]+P1Y1[1−H(ep1)]}
and numerically optimize (e0, e1, Y0, Y1) for the minimum.
5. Calculate the key rate R = min0≤Yj ,ebj≤1{P0Y0[1−H(e
p
0)] + P1Y1[1−H(ep1)]} − Iec.
The signal intensity µ is numerically optimized to maximize the key rate. A typical
value of µ ranges from 0.001 to 0.02. When the number of phases N is large, µ is
approximately the decay rate η.
Appendix C.2. Decoy
1. First we calculate Pj =
∑∞
l=0
µlN+je−µ
(lN+j)!
.
2. Then we calculate Fj(ρx, ρy) ≥
∣∣∣∣∣
∑∞
l=0
µlN+j
(lN+j)!
2−
lN+j
2 (cos lN+j4 pi+sin
lN+j
4
pi)
∑∞
l=0
µlN+j
(lN+j)!
∣∣∣∣∣.
3. Next we calculate Fµν = 1−O
(
µN
N !
)
.
4. For (e0, e1, Y0, Y1) in the domain defined by
|Y µj − Y νj | ≤
√
1− F 2µν
|eµj Y µj − eνjY νj | ≤
√
1− F 2µν
Qµ =
N−1∑
j=0
P µj Y
µ
j
EµQµ =
N−1∑
j=0
eµjP
µ
j Y
µ
j ,
we calculate ∆j and e
p
j according to Eq. (2.17) and (2.18).
5. Substitute the above quantities into min0≤Yj ,ebj≤1{P0Y0[1−H(e
p
0)]+P1Y1[1−H(ep1)]}
and numerically optimize (e0, e1, Y0, Y1) for the minimum.
6. Calculate the key rate R = min0≤Yj ,ebj≤1{P0Y0[1−H(e
p
0)] + P1Y1[1−H(ep1)]} − Iec.
The decoy and signal intensities µ and ν are numerically optimized to maximize
the key rate. A typical value of µ is 0.5. One weak decoy state with a typical mean
photon number of ν = 0.001 and one vacuum state are used.
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